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the damage as "indirectly resulting ' 26 from the act committed
in Livingston Parish.
It is submitted that the court adopted a restricted view of
article 74. It qualifies the phrase "where the damages were sus-
tained" to mean there must be independent damage and it can-
not be "indirectly resulting" from another cause of action. This
will prevent "forum shopping" in the situation where the injury
occurs in one parish and the injured party goes to another par-
ish to recover from the injury but carries the pain with him.
Article 74 had as one of its purposes the remedying of earlier
cases 27 in which the wrongful conduct occurred in one parish
and the damages were sustained in another. The court in the
instant case seems to indicate that this remedy will be available
only where there is a substantial damage incurred in a second
parish. This interpretation will serve to prevent the splitting
of a cause of action in order to allow the plaintiff to pick capri-
ciously the venue in which he will sue.2 1 It is submitted that
the apparent desire of the legislature, to prevent forum shopping
yet allow the action to be brought in the parish where the dam-
age was sustained, should not be limited as in the instant case.
It seems the court has injected a new question into all tort ac-
tions, that of whether the damages claimed are "direct and
determinable" or whether they are "indirect and subjectively
nebulous."
Charles S. McCowan, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - SYSTEMATIC
INCLUSION IN JURY SELECTION
Brooks, a Negro, was indicted for rape of a white woman by
a grand jury impaneled under a system that excluded Negroes.
Aware that Brook's indictment was invalid because of a decision
rendered since the original indictment,' the district judge ap-
pointed a new jury commission. This commission selected six-
teen prospective jurors, two of them Negroes, who were also
chosen for the new grand jury that re-indicted Brooks. A mo-
20. 184 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
27. See note 8 supra.
28. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 425 (1960).
1. Stoker v. State, 331 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960). Conviction re-
versed and indictment dismissed because of 50-year history of exclusion of Negroes
on the grand jury list.
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tion to quash the indictment because of intentional inclusion of
Negroes on the grand jury was denied and Brooks was con-
victed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also rejected 2 this
claim of unconstitutional racial inclusion.3 After exhausting
state remedies,4 Brooks sought federal habeas corpus relief. The
district court refused the writ and he appealed. Held, denial of
the writ affirmed. Constitutional standards requiring fair rep-
resentation, and the duty of jury commissioners to be acquainted
with identifiable elements of the community which have been
the object of state discrimination not only permit, but compel
conscious inclusion of Negroes where necessary to insure a rep-
resentative jury panel, provided there is no purposeful inclusion
of a predetermined number. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1966).
As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced:
"It is a right to which every colored man is entitled that in
the selection of jurors ... there shall be ito exclusion of his
race ... because of ... color."5 (Emphasis added.)
The very next term, the Court reiterated this proposition,0 and
it has become well settled through emphasis and re-emphasis
that constitutional due process and equal protection do not toler-
ate exclusion from jury lists because of race.' Akins v. Texass
added that the rule against racial exclusion may not be circum-
vented by token inclusion if the number to be included is pre-
determined or purposefully limited. It was this practice Justice
Frankfurter condemned in his concurring opinion in Cassell v.
Texas9 as purposeful exclusion through inclusion of token num-
2. Failing to comply with procedural requirements as set out under TEXAS
CODE CRIAM. PRoc. art. 759a, § 6 (1965 Supplement) : "[T]he facts adduced in con-
nection with any motion shall be filed with the clerk separately from the facts
adduced bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant," the evidence in
the hearing of the motion could not be considered. Thus, Brooks' contention
fell at the state appeal level without a real determination of its merits.
3. Brooks v. State, 342 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), on rehearing,
342 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
5. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879).
6. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
7. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Coleman v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 129 (1964) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953) Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ; Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939) Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Rogers v. Ala-
bama, 192 U.S: 226 (1904) ; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
8. 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
9. 339 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1950).
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bers. From this background, and with "arguments which were
admittedly 'opposite and paradoxical'," 10 Collins v. Walker" held
that purposeful inclusion of Negroes in a grand jury list dis-
criminated against a Negro accused and an indictment by such
a grand jury was invalid.
The original Collins opinion, which was withdrawn and not
officially published, 12 relied on the broad language of Cassell,
conceding, however, that its facts were distinguishable. 3 In
the substituted opinion 4 there was no reliance on or even men-
tion of the case; however, in the court's final rehearing opin-
ion, 15 reliance on Cassell returned, but without the factual dis-
tinction.', Thus Collins, entangled in a trilogy of opinions, re-
sulted in a decree that systematic inclusion of Negroes on a jury,
as well as systematic exclusion, was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the words
of Judge Dawkins:
"[T]he majority decision now rendered indeed places jury
commissioners . ., in a virtually insoluble dilemma, where
compilation of a constitutional jury list may be an impos-
sibility.' 7
With both systematic inclusion and exclusion of Negroes offend-
ing the Constitution, systematic selection of grand jury venires
would be difficult. A jury containing no Negroes would be
open to attack for systematic exclusion, while a jury having
Negro membership (in any number) could come under fire for
systematic inclusion. The Court attempted to ameliorate the
dilemma by permitting inclusion if far enough removed from
the final selection.'8 However, Collins's compound enigma can be
seen in Judge Jones's statement that "perhaps Negroes must be
10. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
-Criminal Procedure, 24 LA. L. REv. 326, 331 (1964).
11. 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied sub nom., Hanchey v. Collins, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
12. It is the revised opinion, substituted for the original, that is found at 329
F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964). The original may be found in "Appendix A" to
Judge Dawkins' dissenting opinion on the second rehearing, 335 F.2d 417, 429
(5th Cir. 1964).
13. 335 F.2d 417, 433 (5th Cir. 1964).
14. 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964). This opinion used much of the same
general reasoning as the original. It omitted statements and implications, felt
to be unnecessary and possibly offensive, concerning fears of Negroes in voting
without bias on the jury.
15. 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1964).
16. Id. at 420.
17. 335 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
18. Id. at 420-21.
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included in the general venire list although it will be assumed
that this is not to be done purposefully."' 9
Despite the presumption that officers selecting a jury panel
have performed their duty lawfully,20 Collins aroused grave con-
cern whether any grand jury could return valid indictments of
Negroes.2 1 In the instant case the court recognized the dilemma
of having a jury that represents a fair cross section of the com-
munity, 22 chosen by selectors under a duty to learn of qualified
Negroes in the community, 23 and a doctrine of neither inclusion
nor exclusion because of race.2 4 Brooks specifically overruled
Collins and formulated two requirements- (1) fair representa-
tion and (2) a duty to know significant identifiable elements of
the community which have been the object of state discrimina-
tion,25 this duty requiring inclusion in some cases. The court
stated clearly that if in the community make-up, identifiable
racial groups are significant elements, awareness of the com-
munity must include an awareness of race as such.
"When that class is a racial group and, moreover, a racial
group which historically has been the object or victim of
state-generated discrimination, the selectors can perform
their constitutionally-imposed duty only by being conscious
of that class. ' 26
The court explained the idea of class consciousness and the duty
of the jury selectors in these words:
"[A] juror selector could fulfill that duty only by being aware
of that race and the steps reasonably needed to assure rep-
resentation of that race in the 'universe' from which jurors
are obtained. Not only may he do so, he must.' '27 (Emnhasis
added.)
The requirement seems clear - systematic inclusion is part
19. Id. at 421 (concurring opinion).
20. Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903).
21. Shortly after Collins, LA. R.S. 15:180 (1950) was amended by La. Acts
1964, No. 161, providing that the names of jurymen should be drawn "indis-
criminately and by lot" from the general venire in an effort to avoid charges
of systematic inclusion or exclusion.
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) ; Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
(1945) ; Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
23. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400
(1942) ; United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100
(5th Cir. 1964).
25. No. 22809 at 46, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., July 29, 1966.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Id. at 50-51.
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of the duty of jury selectors as "the steps reasonably needed to
assure representation":
"[I] ntentional inclusion on the general jury list based on race
is a means of converting the constitutional mandate of a fair
jury list into a reality. ' 2
Thus the court has presented a clear outline of how the practical
problems of jury selection may be met.
It is submitted that Collins met its inevitable fate and the
instant case offers not only a solution to the dilemma facing
many jury commissions, but also is more in keeping with the
historical trend of decisions in this area. Collins appears to be
a mutation created through reliance on dicta and excerpts taken
out of context, while Brooks states clearly what has been implied
in earlier decisions. In Akins v. Texas29 the Supreme Court, by
affirming a conviction on a record showing purposeful inclusion,
in effect approved such inclusion. In Moore v. State30 a charge
of exclusion was rejected when no studied evasion was found,
but rather it was demonstrated that there was a deliberate at-
tempt to insure Negro representation by inclusion. There the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.31 Even Cassell, upon which
Collins purported to rely, has not been treated by the Supreme
Court as a prohibition against purposeful inclusion. On the con-
trary, it has been considered a case of exclusion through a device
of limited inclusion, as in Brown v. Allen 32 where Cassell was
cited in support of the proposition that limited inclusion equals
systematic exclusion. In Eubanks v. Louisiana,33 Cassell was
cited as one of an unbroken line of cases holding exclusion be-
cause of race to be a denial of equal protection. In Hernandez
v. Texas34 the Court characterized Cassell as a rule of exclusion.
The language35 from Cassell relied on in Collins was dicta, the
very next sentence in the decision being:. "Our holding that
there was discrimintion . . . is based on another ground. '3 6
Thus Collins found no real support in the case it cited, and with-
28. Id. at 73 (concurring opinion).
29. 325 U.S. 398, 404 n.4, 406 (1945).
30. 229 Ark. 335, 315 S.W.2d 907 (1958).
31. 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
32. 344 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1953).
33. 356 U.S. 584, 585 (1958).
34. 347 U.S. 475, 480 n.11 (1954).
35. 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950) : "An accused is entitled to have charges against
him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion
nor exclusion because of race."
36. 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950).
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out the approach adopted in the withdrawn opinion, many of
its generalities rested on unfirm ground.
Judge Wisdom, concurring, 37 feels Brooks and Collins are
not inconsistent because of the difference in the jury systems in
the cases. Yet, it would seem there is no way the principles of
the two decisions could have survived together. It is submitted
that Judge Wisdom's distinction is too fine and too susceptible
of arbitrary application. Further, it seems to ignore the com-
pelling reason for the demise of Collins; that Collins was un-
realistic and left no jury safe from attack. It is submitted that
to distinguish Collins because of the different stages in the se-
lection process at which inclusion occurred adds little to the
solution of the dilemma created. There are too many methods
of jury selection with different levels in their process.38 To say
inclusion at the "general venire level" (which perhaps includes
several hundred names) or the "prospective panel level" (which
includes few names more than the number to be selected) is per-
missible, but not at the "final selection level," offers no solution
to a state with two levels in its selection process. May such
a state still include at its beginning level, even though this level
is not a general venire of hundreds, but a select group only a
few more than those necessary on the final panel, and at its sec-
ond level also, which results in the final panel? Or must there
be no inclusion at the second level because it is the final process?
Or since there are only two levels, closely related, is there any
room for inclusion at all? What is the position of the state with
an even larger number of stages? It is simply unworkable to
predicate purposeful inclusion on the number of stages removed
from final selection, and would result in a case by case deter-
mination rather than by general principles.
The dangers envisioned by Judges Gewin and Bell-in their
separate concurring opinions in Brooks are perhaps exaggerated.
To say that jury selection officials will be on trial for "failing
37. No. 22809 at 57, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., July 29, 1966 (concurring
opinion).
38. Louisiana has a three-stage selection process. See LA. 1.S. 15:172-203
(1950) ; after January 1, 1967, LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 401-419
(1967). Texas employs a two-stage process. TEXAS CODE OF CRI3. PROC. arts.
19.06-19.26 (1965). For examples of other selection procedures, see N.Y. JUDI-
CIARY LAW § 684, three-stage process; ILL. 1.S. ch. 78, §§ 1-12 (1957), modified
three-stage process including provisions for summonsing bystanders if necessary
to complete the panel; MIss. CODE ch. 9, §§ 1.766-1780 (1942, recompiled 1956),
four-stage procedure involving several jury boxes and at least two drawings.
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to do enough searching"3 9 is to say no more than could have
been said prior to Brooks. Contrary to Judge Gewin's analysis,
the majority in Brooks does not demand a searching for all com-
ponents of a particular community; it requires knowledge of
"significant identifiable elements of the community which have
been the object of state discrimination." While astute counsel
might attempt to use the rule to challenge juries that are not
mirrors of the community, 40 it will not be a lavish new ground
for delay. Perfectly proportional representation is not contem-
plated by the majority in the instant case: "The dual require-
rments making awareness of race inevitable must be met .... It
must never, simply never, be applied to secure proportional rep-
resentation. ' 41 The court points out that neither symbolic nor
proportional representation is permitted; proportional as well as
token representation will be condemned as a form of exclusion
in the guise of limited inclusion. This is consistent with Swain
v. Alabama42 where the Supreme Court held that the jury list
need not be a perfect mirror of the community nor an accurate
reflection of the proportionate strength of every identifiable
group.
However, how is a jury list to be fairly representative of
the community without some consideration being given to pro-
portion? Thus when the Court decries proportional representa-
tion, it must mean only representation that is exactly propor-
tional. But one may find it difficult to distinguish Brooks's re-
quired inclusion from the inclusion damned as being exclusion
through token compliance or proportional representation. Not-
withstanding, this stand on purposeful inclusion presents a
clearly defined method to safeguard many juries from attack.
The majority opinion simply takes the constitutional premise
that a jury list must reflect a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity and provides a means to accomplish this- requiring ac-
quaintance with the make-up of the community and purposeful
inclusion based on an awareness of race. Brooks may seem to
create a weighty formula, speaking as it does of fair representa-
tion, the duty to become acquainted and the duty to include
where necessary. However, the rule of Brooks is more an ingre-
39. No. 22809 at 68, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., July 29, 1966 (concurring
opinion).
40. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
41. No. 22809 at 51, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., July 29, 1966.
42. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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dient than a formula. It requires conscious inclusion, an ingre-
dient that was unavailable before, but which is now permissible
for formulas to be precisely developed in the future. Certainly
the instant case leaves many questions, for the court did not
deal with the practical problems of the nebulous area between
"inclusion" and "inclusion of predetermined numbers." It sim-
ply opens the way by overruling Collins and seems to suggest
that as subsequent cases arise, specific guidelines will be con-
sidered. With Collins the door was closed to any method of de-
liberate inclusion, even as a means of procuring a fair repre-
sentation of Negroes. Brooks removes the impossible situation
of Collins by not only permitting conscious inclusion, but de-
manding it where necessary to promote fair representation.
Thus the holding in Brooks is limited, only putting aside the
barrier that prevented use of the most logical means of produc-
ing fairly representative jury lists, i.e., consciously correcting
exclusion by inclusion. Undoubtedly the court must and will
establish more stringent sanctions in the actual administration
of permissible inclusion. As the Fifth Circuit Court said earlier,
"[W]e synthesize principles and sanctions which experience
demonstrates are needed. 4 3
Brooks is more in keeping with earlier decisions than Collins
and puts forth a mandate that is a workable component in the
major problem in jury selection - a solution at least during
our present racially conscious times. 44 It is submitted that the
instant case offers to a judge instructing a jury commission the
safe position of stating the dual constitutional requirements of
Brooks and offers to the commission a realistic means of adher-
ing to those instructions.
John T. Cox, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT To COUNSEL
Incriminating statements obtained by isolated interrogation
of each of four defendants in police custody were admitted at
trial. No defendant had been warned of his constitutional rights
at the outset of questioning. Held, convictions reversed. If state-
43. United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1965).
44. The court intimates that the affirmative duty of inclusion may pass away
as the ultimate formula is devised. "As success is achieved and the constitutional
ideal of a prejudiceless society is attained, the law will surely have both the
capacity for and the duty of molding its relief to that hoped for situation." Brooks
v. Beto, No. 22809 at 55, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir.. July 29. 1966.
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